This paper presents a comprehensive view of lifetime taxation including both explicit taxation through the general tax system and implicit taxation via the retirement benefit formula. Differences in productivity between individuals are unobservable, which provides a rationale for the use of distortionary taxes. It is shown that the optimal structure of age-dependent taxation can be characterized by a generalized Ramsey formula. Furthermore, the paper derives the optimal retirement benefit formula in the presence of the general tax system and examines the compatibility with the financial stability of the pension system. JEL classification: H21, H55.
INTRODUCTION
Pay-as-you-go pension schemes redistribute between generations. If the economy is dynamically efficient, transfers to previous generations constitute an implicit debt, which in present-value terms corresponds exactly to the implicit tax burden of the public pension system. 1 In this context, the retirement benefit formula plays a key role. It establishes the link between generations and across the individual life-cycle by relating contributions in each period and pension benefits. It therefore determines how labor supply is implicitly taxed in each period. To minimize the excess burden, agedependent taxation through the retirement benefit formula should be optimally designed. Existing pension formulas, however, usually follow an actuarial logic and tax contributions when young higher than when old (see Beckmann, 2000; Bütler, 2002; Lindbeck and Persson, 2003, p. 85) . It is questionable as to whether such an implicit tax schedule is optimal from an incentive point of view.
The framework to analyze the optimal design of the retirement benefit formula has so far been the standard Ramsey model with a representative agent. This approach does not consider that a key motivation for the use of distortionary explicit and implicit taxes are unobservable differences in productivity between individuals. In this paper, it is shown that the results have to be modified once heterogeneity of individuals is taken into account. In particular, the retirement benefit formula cannot only be based on agedependent elasticities of labor supply. Furthermore, the analysis of the optimal retirement benefit formula has generally abstracted from the general tax system. This paper extends the analysis and provides a comprehensive view of lifetime taxation including both explicit taxation through the general tax system and implicit taxation via the retirement benefit formula.
The following section places the analysis in the context of the literature. In Section 3, the model is presented. Section 4 shows how the optimal tax problem can be solved in two steps. In Section 5, a generalized Ramsey rule for age-dependent taxation is derived. Section 6 discusses the implications for designing the optimal retirement benefit formula. In Section 7, the compatibility with the financial stability of the pension system is examined. Further aspects are discussed in Section 8. A final section concludes. Wrede (1999) was the first to examine optimal age-dependent taxation through the retirement benefit formula and to show the equivalence to a standard Ramsey problem. His analysis was extended by Fenge et al. (2006) who derive the elasticity formula for optimal age-dependent taxation and estimate labor supply elasticities for different age groups. Assuming that the compensated elasticity of labor supply with respect to wages in other periods is zero, they find that the age-dependent taxes implicit in the German pension formula are not optimal. Instead, the optimal time structure of implicit taxes should follow a steeper tax profile for male workers and a 'U-shaped' (or mildly 'N-shaped') tax profile for female workers.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Another strand of the literature has examined age-dependent taxation without considering the link to the retirement benefit formula. Here, the conclusion is that a tax system should generally be conditioned on age. In a standard life-cycle growth model, this result is obtained by Erosa and Gervais (2002) who solve the Ramsey problem of age-dependent taxation. They show that an optimizing government will generally use capital and labor income tax rates, which vary with age. In a three-period life-cycle model, Lozachmeur (2006) draws a similar conclusion. In his approach, a representative agent chooses the level of education when young and the retirement age when old. The government sets a tax rate for labor income in each period. He even finds M. Kifmann r 2008 The Authors that the first-best optimum can be reached by age-dependent taxation if the young can borrow. This solution, however, may not be possible if the young face borrowing constraints.
The papers by Erosa and Gervais (2002) and Lozachmeur (2006) assume a uniform tax rate for each age-period. A different approach is taken by Kremer (2001) who adapts the optimal tax model by Mirrlees (1971) to take into account differences in age. He shows that the government can improve the efficiency of the tax system by conditioning the marginal income tax rates on age. For example, he finds that young workers have a more elastic labor supply than prime-age workers and that income when young is relatively uncorrelated with income later in life. These age-dependent characteristics lead him to the conclusion that marginal tax rates should be lower for the young.
All papers mentioned look in isolation at either the retirement benefit formula or at the general tax system. However, Bütler (2002) shows that both ways of taxation can in principle be analyzed within one framework. Furthermore, all papers, with the exception of Kremer (2001) , assume that individuals are homogeneous or analyze an economy with a representative agent. Yet, the second-best problem of income taxation arises mainly because individuals differ in productivity, which cannot be observed by the government.
In these two aspects, the present paper differs from the existing literature. On the one hand, it considers a world in which individuals are heterogeneous with respect to productivity. Here the paper stays within the framework of Erosa and Gervais (2002) , Fenge et al. (2006) and Wrede (1999) and assumes a uniform tax rate for each age-period. A generalized Ramsey formula is derived and contrasted with the findings of these papers. On the other hand, the paper characterizes the optimal retirement benefit formula in the presence of the general tax system. In addition, the paper examines the restrictions on the retirement benefit formula imposed by the requirement that the pension system should be financially stable.
THE MODEL

The economy
Similar to Fenge et al. (2006) and Wrede (1999) , I analyze a small open economy. The constant interest rate is r. 2 The framework is an overlapping generations model in which individuals live for three periods. Production is described by a standard constant-returns-to-scale production function, which implies that wages are fixed each period. Technological progress, however, can increase wages over time. The population growth rate in period t is m t . Furthermore, I assume in the following that the interest rate is always higher 2. The assumption of a constant interest rate keeps the exposition and notation as simple as possible and does not affect the main results of this paper. In footnotes 5 and 9, I point out possible changes if the interest rate is not constant. than the growth rate of total wages. This rules out a Pareto-improvement by introducing a pay-as-you-go pension scheme or public debt.
The individual problem
Individuals work in the first two periods and are retired in the last period. Preferences of an individual born in period t are described by the utility function U c 1;t ; c 2;tþ1 ; c 3;tþ2 ; l 1;t ; l 2;tþ1 À Á where c a,t and l a,t are consumption and labor supply. The subscript (a, t) denotes the individual's 'age' a 5 1, 2, 3 in period t. Labor income in period t is equal to w t zl a,t where w t is the wage rate per efficiency unit in period t and z the productivity of the individual. Individuals differ in productivity z[fz;
zg which is distributed according to the distribution function F t (z) for individuals born in period t. In the following, I assume that neither z nor labor supply l a,t are observable.
The age-dependent tax rate on labor income is t l a;t . Furthermore, each individual receives a tax-financed basic income B a,t in each period of her life a 5 1, 2, 3. Individuals must contribute to the public pension system when working. The contribution rate to the pension system in period t is b t . The pension benefit for individuals born in period t during retirement depends on contributions through the formula
where a tþ2 is the minimum pension and b a,t is the pension return factor on contributions in period t for an individual with age a. Pension benefits thus consist of a Beveridgian component a tþ2 and an earnings-related Bismarckian component, which is captured by the last two terms. 3 With a perfect capital market, the problem for an individual born in period t with productivity z is max c 1;t ;c 2;tþ1 ;c 3;tþ2 ;l 1;t ;l 2;tþ1 U c 1;t ; c 2;tþ1 ; c 3;tþ2 ; l 1;t ; l 2;tþ1 À Á ð2Þ
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint
The total tax rate on labor income, t 1,t , is defined by 4
where the indirect labor tax rates t b a;t through the pension system are given by
Furthermore, the present value of total transfers for an individual born in period t is given by
where B t denotes the present value of tax-financed basic income
Using the pension formula (1), the budget constraint (3) can therefore be simplified to
Hence, only the total tax rates t a,t and the total transfer G t matter from the point of view of an individual. Utility maximization yields the indirect utility function
Inter-and intragenerational welfare
Intragenerational welfare within generation t is captured by the social welfare function
Furthermore, I assume that there is a concern for intergenerational welfare represented by the intergenerational welfare function 4. See Bütler (2002) , equation (4), for a general formula for the total tax rate on labor income which allows for an arbitrary number of periods during which individuals work or are retired. 
where r40 is the intergenerational discount rate.
Budget balance in the pension system
Pensions are organized on a pay-as-you-go basis. To facilitate the notation, I define Z 1;t Z z z w t zl 1;t dF t ðzÞ and Z 2;t Z z z w t zl 2;t dF tÀ1 ðzÞ ð 12Þ
as the average labor income of individuals with age a in period t. Then the condition for a balanced budget of the pension system in period t can be written as
where N t is the size of the generation entering the labor force in period t.
Tax restrictions
The present value of labor income tax payments of generation t must cover tax-financed transfers B t within their generation and transfers to other generations T d t in terms of a change in public debt (both in per capita terms):
In the pension system, implicit taxes T b t per person due to the gains of other generations are given by the difference between the present value of contribution and benefits, i.e.
Inserting the pension formula (1) and using definitions (5) and (12) 
which states that individuals of a generation finance their basic pension and implicit transfers T b t to other generations. The basic pension is therefore financed by each generation itself.
The total tax per capita to be paid by generation t, T t , is given by
Combining (15), (16) and (17) and using the definition of G t [equation (6)] yields the intragenerational present-value constraint for the maximization of intragenerational social welfare of generation t in per capita terms: Population growth rate in period t t Time index and index for individuals born in period t (generation t) a,t Subscript: in period t the individual has age a, i.e. is in period a of her life c a,t
Consumption of an individual with age a in period t l a,t
Labor supply of an individual with age a in period t w t
Wage rate per efficiency unit of labor in period t z
Productivity of an individual, distributed in z[fz; zg according to the distribution function F t (z) for generation t Z a,t Labor income w t zl a,t Z a;t Average labor income of individuals with age a in period t t a,t
Total tax rate on labor income for an individual with age a in period t t l a;t Direct tax rate on labor income t b a;t Indirect tax rate on labor income through the pension system G t Present value of total intragenerational transfers B a,t
Tax-financed basic income for an individual with age a in period t B t Present value of tax-financed basic income b t Contribution rate to the public pension system in period t p t Pension benefit in period t a t
Minimum pension in period t b a,t Pension return factor on contributions in period t for an individual with age a 
The constraint for intergenerational welfare maximization is 5
Here, D is the explicit and implicit debt inherited from previous generations. Constraint (19) states that the present value of the taxes paid by all generations must be equal to D. This formulation rules out that the government runs a Ponzi game. An overview over the notation is given in Table 1 .
THE OPTIMAL TAX PROBLEM
The optimal tax problem is to find the optimal tax rates t 1,t , t 2,tþ1 , intragenerational transfers G t and intergenerational transfers T t for all generations t, which maximize intra-and intergenerational welfare. This problem can be solved in two steps:
(1) Maximization of intragenerational welfare subject to constraint (18) With the intragenerational welfare function (10) and a given value of the total tax T t to be paid by generation t, the problem is
This yieldŝ
and optimal intragenerational welfareŴ t ðT t ; w t ; w tþ1 ; F t ðzÞÞ.
5. If the interest rate is not constant, the constraint is (2) Maximization of intergenerational welfare subject to constraint (19) With the intergenerational welfare function (11), the problem corresponds to
This yields the optimal intergenerational transfers T * t and therefore the optimal values t * 1;t ðw t ; w tþ1 ; F t ðzÞÞ; t * 2;tþ1 ðw t ; w tþ1 ; F t ðzÞÞ; G * t ðw t ; w tþ1 ; F t ðzÞÞ for all periods t.
From an incentive point of view, problem ( P1) is the interesting economic problem. Because I assume that only labor income but neither z nor labor supply l a,t are observable, it must be solved in a second-best analysis. It is similar to the optimum linear income tax problem (see Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980, p. 407 ). However, the tax rate is allowed to be age specific. It differs from the approach by Fenge et al. (2006) , Wrede (1999) and the life-cycle taxation problem analyzed by Erosa and Gervais (2002) because these authors assume that all individuals of one generation are identical. In Section 5, I solve problem ( P1) and show that the results are modified when individuals are heterogeneous. The solution to problem ( P2) depends decisively on the interest rate, the intergenerational discount rate and productivity changes over time. This can be seen by solving the Lagrangian
The first-order conditions are
Rewriting condition (21a) yields where À@Ŵ t =@T t is the marginal social welfare of intergenerational transfers per member of generation t. With respect to the interest rate r and the intergenerational discount rate r, we therefore obtain rar , À @Ŵ tþ1 @T tþ1 a À @Ŵ t @T t for all t i.e. the marginal social welfare of intergenerational transfers per capita will rise over time if the intergenerational discount rate exceeds the interest rate and vice versa. Assuming that w t ,w t þ1 and F t (z) are identical for all generations and that the marginal social welfare of intergenerational transfers is decreasing in T t , it is possible to derive which generations should pay higher taxes. In this case, generations differ in social welfareŴ t ðT t ; w t ; w tþ1 ; F t ðzÞÞ only due to T t . Equation (22) would therefore imply that later-born generations should have higher marginal social welfare of intergenerational transfers if r > r. This implies lower transfers or, equivalently, a higher tax burden. Analogously, a lower tax burden would be warranted for ror.
However, if w t ,w tþ1 or F t (z) differ between generations, this result may not hold. For example, if wages increase over time due to rising productivity, the marginal social welfare of intergenerational transfers will tend to fall as laterborn generations become richer. Equation (22) then calls for a reduction of intergenerational transfers to later-born generations. In this case, it is possible that later-born generations should bear a higher tax burden even though ror.
OPTIMAL STRUCTURE OF LABOR INCOME TAXATION
In this section, I solve problem ( P1) to find the optimal structure of labor income taxation. Because I look at one generation in isolation, the indices distinguishing generations are dropped. The Lagrangian is
I assume that the second-order conditions are met. Applying Roy's identity yields
where @V=@G is the private marginal utility of income. Furthermore, with the Slutsky relationship
where S kt is the derivative of the compensated demand curve, the first-order conditions (24a) and (24b) can be written as
Following Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, p. 387 ) the net social marginal valuation of income of an individual with productivity z can be defined as nðzÞ @W @V @V @G
In terms of government revenue, n(z) states how social welfare changes if the income of an individual with productivity z is increased by additional transfers. It is a net measure because it considers both the gain in social welfare due to an increase in income (the first term) and the change in tax payments due to this increase in income (the second and third terms). Using definition (27), the first-order conditions (24a) to (24c) can be transformed into 
Condition (28c) implies n ¼ 1, i.e. the lump-sum element should be chosen such that the net social marginal valuation of a unitary transfer (measured in terms of government revenue) is on average equal to its cost. Now defining the compensated elasticities of labor supply in period k with respect to wage in period t
and using the symmetry relationship S 12 5 S 21 and n ¼ 1 allow to transform conditions (28a) and (28b) into
Rearranging and defining labor income by Z t w t zl t ð1 þ rÞ 1Àt yields 6
because Covðn; Z t Þ ¼ R z z nðzÞ À n ½ Z t dFðzÞ. These covariances are marginal measures of inequality (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980, p. 408) . Solving for t t /(1 À t t ) results in
6. Note that the compensated elasticities will usually depend on productivity z and can therefore not be transferred to the other side of the integral sign. Combining (32a) and (32b) leads us to the following result for the optimal structure of age-dependent taxation:
Proposition 1. The optimal tax rates fulfill the generalized Ramsey rule
In general, taxation will be age-specific as in Erosa and Gervais (2002) , Fenge et al. (2006) and Wrede (1999) . However, the analysis yields a different result because individuals are allowed to be heterogeneous. This can best be seen when condition (33) is compared with the standard Ramsey rule (see Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980, p. 375; Fenge et al., 2006) :
which abstracts from income inequality and the possibility of lump-sum taxation. 7 Comparing conditions (33) and (34) shows two important differences:
(1) In the general solution (33), elasticities are multiplied by income. This captures the fact that the additional deadweight loss due to a marginal increase in the tax rate is larger for individuals with higher income. (2) In the optimal solution, the covariances of the net social marginal valuation of income and labor income in each period is crucial. Assuming that labor income Z t is a non-decreasing function of productivity z, this covariance is non-positive if the net social marginal valuation of income is non-increasing with z. For instance, assume e 12 5 e 21 5 0. Then
i.e. the tax rate tends to be higher in the period in which the covariance of labor income and the net social marginal valuation of income is higher in absolute terms. Intuitively, income should be taxed more in the period with higher inequality. For example, the wage rates influence Cov(v, Z t ).
Using Z t 5 w t zl t yields Covðn; Z t Þ ¼ w t Z z z nðzÞ À n ½ zl t dFðzÞ 7. Erosa and Gervais (2002, p. 360) derive an alternative formulation of the Ramsey rule for directly additive utility function (see Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980, p. 379) . They show that the relative age-dependent tax rates on labor income are inversely related to the relative income elasticities of age-specific labor supply. Thus, if the wage rate rises over time due to technical progress, the covariance will also tend to increase (in absolute value). This would be an argument for taxing individuals higher when old. In addition, higher taxes when old are warranted if individuals with low productivity tend to work less when old, e.g. due to poorer health. This would also support the hypothesis that |Cov(v, Z 2 )|4|Cov(v, Z 1 )|. 8
If individuals are homogeneous, then Cov(v, Z 1 ) 5 Cov(v, Z 2 ) 5 0 which leads to t 1 5 t 2 5 0 by (32a) and (32b). In this case, the budget constraint (18) implies
Therefore, transfers to other generations and other public expenditure are financed by negative intragenerational transfers ÀG t , i.e. by lump-sum taxation. In the models of Erosa and Gervais (2002), Fenge et al. (2006) and Wrede (1999) , this possibility is excluded because they implicitly impose the restriction G t ¼ 0 which leads to the standard Ramsey rule (34). Finally, it would be interesting to see whether the empirical results of Fenge et al. (2006) still hold if formula (33) is used instead of (34). They assume e 12 5 e 21 5 0. In this case, equation (35) describes the optimal structure of taxation. A plausible hypothesis is that inequality increases with age, i.e. |Cov(v, Z 2 )|4|Cov(v, Z 1 )|. However, it may already be instructive to assume Cov(v, Z 1 ) 5 Cov(v, Z 2 ) and to see whether weighting elasticities with income instead of using average elasticities leads to different results.
THE OPTIMAL RETIREMENT BENEFIT FORMULA
In this section, I take an optimal solution T * t ; t * 1;t ; t * 2;tþ1 ; G * t as given and examine the implications for the design of the tax and pension system for a particular generation t, i.e. the parameters t l * 1;t ; t l * 2;tþ1 and a * tþ2 ; b * 1;t ; b * 2;tþ1 . The following equations summarize the requirements for the parameters t l * 1;t ; t b * 1;t ; t l * 2;tþ1 ; t b * 2;tþ1 ; B * t ; T b * t ; T d * t ; a * tþ2 ; b * 1;t ; b * 2;tþ1 which can be chosen for each generation t [see equations (4)-(6) and (15)-(17)]:
8. However, it cannot a priori be ruled out that one of the covariances is positive. For example, if high productivity individuals prefer to work only little in period 2, then Cov(v, Z 2 ) could become positive. In this case, equation (35) would call for a negative tax t 2 , i.e. for a subsidization of labor income in period 2.
Note that the contribution rates b t and b tþ1 [see equation (14)]
are determined by the retirement benefit formulas of past generations and are independent of a * tþ2 ; b * 1;t ; b * 2;tþ1 . Because the budget constraint t * 1;t Z * 1;t þ t * 2;tþ1 Z * 2;tþ1 ð1 þ rÞ À1 ¼ T * t þ G * t ð18 0 Þ is met in the optimum, one of the equations (41)-(43) is redundant. Dropping equation (42) yields seven equations for ten unknowns. Three parameters can therefore be chosen with the restrictions either a * tþ2 or B * t [condition (41)] either t l * 1;t or t b * 1;t or b * 1;t [conditions (37) and (39)] either t l * 2;tþ1 or t b * 2;tþ1 or b * 2;tþ1 [conditions (38) and (40)] In particular, a * tþ2 ; b * 1;t and b * 2;tþ1 can be chosen freely for each generation. This implies Proposition 2. Without further restrictions, any retirement benefit formula can be optimal.
This result is in contrast to Fenge et al. (2006) and Wrede (1999) who did not consider the existence of a general tax system. It is explained by the fact Age-Dependent Taxation and the Optimal Retirement Benefit Formula r 2008 The Authors Journal Compilation r Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2008 that the public pension system and the general tax system are perfect substitutes with respect to labor income taxation. Note, however, that once a retirement benefit formula is chosen, all the remaining parameters t l * 1;t ; t b * 1;t ; t l * 2;tþ1 ; t b * 2;tþ1 ; B * t ; T b * t ; T d * t are determined, i.e. tax and debt policy must follow the design of the pension system. Imposing restrictions on the general tax system, however, may yield an 'optimal retirement benefit formula'. In particular, consider the case that direct taxes on labor income cannot be conditioned on age, i.e. t l * 1;t ¼ t l * 2;tþ1 ¼ t l * . Then the retirement benefit formula is essential in differentiating tax rates by age. Using (37)-(40) yields
and therefore
Proposition 3. If direct taxes on labor income cannot be conditioned on age, i.e. t l * 1;t ¼ t l * 2;tþ1 ¼ t l * , then the retirement benefit formula is essential in implementing age-dependent taxation.
This result is important in the context of the analysis by Erosa and Gervais (2002) who also consider the case that age-dependent tax rates are not possible. However, they only take into account explicit taxes. Through a pension system, it is easily possible to implement age-dependent tax rates. In fact, current retirement pension formulas usually imply age-dependent tax rates which fall through the contributor's working life (Bütler, 2002) . For example, this is the case in the German pension formula, which may even lead to a negative implicit tax rate (Beckmann, 2000) . Notional Defined Contributions Systems, in which the rate of return equals the growth rate of the aggregate wage sum, also imply an implicit tax schedule which is decreasing in age (see Lindbeck and Persson, 2003, p. 85) . However, whereas these formulas rely on actuarial concepts, the analysis in Section 5 has argued that age-dependent taxation should follow the generalized Ramsey rule (33). Substituting equations (37) and (38) into (33) and using t l * 1;
and the corresponding values b * 1;t and b * 2;tþ1 from equations (47) and (48) as a rule for the implicit taxation through the retirement benefit formula. Note that the retirement benefit formula generally needs to be different for each generation if population growth or average income is not constant over time. This can be seen from equations (47) and (48) which demonstrate that the optimal retirement benefit formula is also determined by the contribution rates in periods t and t þ 1. Equations (45) and (46) show that these depend on past population growth rates and average incomes of generations t À 1, t and t þ 1 in addition to the retirement benefit formulas for generations t À 2 and t À 1. Thus, even if t b * 1;t and t b * 2;tþ1 are constant over time, b * 1;t and b * 2;tþ1 may vary from generation to generation. 9
FINANCIAL STABILITY
An important aspect of pension systems not considered yet is financial stability. In a strong sense, this can be defined as the ability of a pension system to guarantee a constant contribution rate. A weaker requirement is that the contribution rate should converge to a steady state upon exogenous changes. In the following, I focus on the consequences of a decline in the rate of population growth and ask how the pension system needs to be designed to guarantee a constant contribution rate. In addition, I examine the implications on age-dependent taxation through the pension formula and analyze whether a pension system, which keeps direct and indirect taxes on labor income constant, is financially stable.
A constant contribution rate
The most straightforward way to guarantee financial stability is to keep the contribution rate constant. Using equation (14) yields the condition
One way to meet this requirement is by adjusting the minimum pension a tþ2 . However, this can imply a negative minimum pension, which may not be enforceable if individuals with low productivity do not save for old age. In this case, there must be an offsetting tax-financed transfer in old age to pay for the negative minimum pension. Alternatively, the pension system 9. If the interest rate is not constant, the retirement benefit formula furthermore needs to adapt to fluctuations in the interest rate. In this case, equations (47) and (48) become
where r t is the interest rate in period t. can receive subsidies to guarantee a tþ2 Z0 and a constant contribution rate. If the pension system is not subsidized and the minimum pension a t þ 2 is fixed, then b 1,t and b 2,tþ1 must be used to implement a constant contribution rate. Consider, for example, the case that a tþ2 5 0. Imposing a constant contribution rate b 5 b t 5 b tþ1 5 b tþ2 in equation (49) 
This condition puts a restriction on the choice of b 1,t and b 2,tþ1 . Only one of these parameters can be chosen. For example, a policy that sets the return factors equal to the growth factors of age-dependent income
meets this requirement. 10 As a consequence, the pension return factors must fall upon a decline in the rate of population growth and indirect taxes on labor income t b t increase [see equation (5)]. In general, condition (50) implies that at least one of the pension return factors must be decreased if the rate of population growth falls. It is therefore inevitable that indirect taxes on labor income increase in one period if the contribution rate is to remain constant.
Overall, condition (50) limits the possibility of the pension formula to implement optimal age-dependent taxation. In particular, the retirement benefit formula will generally not be able to differentiate tax rates by age if direct taxes on labor income cannot be conditioned on age and must take a given value t l * ¼ t l * 1;t ¼ t l * 2;tþ1 . In general, b 1,t and b 1,tþ1 cannot meet equations (47), (48) and (50) simultaneously.
10. Note that Notional Defined Contributions Systems, which require the return factors to be equal to the growth factors of the aggregate wage sum, i.e.
generally violate condition (50) and are therefore not able to keep the contribution rate constant (see Valdés-Prieto, 2000) .
Constant direct and indirect taxes on labor income
A constant contribution rate requires that direct and indirect taxes on labor income need to react to changes in population growth. An alternative approach keeps direct and indirect taxes on labor income constant and adjusts the pension return factors. In the following, I examine whether this approach is able to guarantee financial stability. I focus on the case that generations differ only in their size and that the per capita variables are identical for all generations, in particular average income Z t and total taxes on labor income t * 1 and t * 2 . I also rule out that the minimum pension is used to guarantee financial stability and assume that a is fixed.
For given indirect taxes t b * 1 and t b * 2 on labor income, equations (39) and (40) yield the following requirements for the pension return factors:
Substituting into (49), we obtain for the steady-state contribution rate b with constant average income
The numerator is positive if T b t > 0, i.e. if gains of other generations are financed through the pension system [see equation (16)]. Then the steadystate contribution rate is positive due to the assumption r4m. Thus, b falls if the rate of population growth declines. This can be explained by the fact that the rate of return of the pension system is m in a steady state with constant average income. As m falls, indirect taxes through the pension system can only remain constant if less is invested in the pension system. This implies a lower contribution rate.
In Appendix A, I show that a necessary condition for the contribution rate to converge to its new steady-state value upon a decline in the rate of population growth is
Age-Dependent Taxation and the Optimal Retirement Benefit Formula r 2008 The Authors Journal Compilation r Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2008 The assumption r4m implies k 1 (r, m)41. Consequently, the contribution rate does not converge to the new steady-state contribution rate if the rate of population growth changes. This can be explained with the pension return factors in equations (53) and (54): in a steady state, the internal rate of return of the pension system is m. As both pension return factors are increasing in the contribution rate, a contribution rate larger than b increases the rate of return above m, which requires further increases in the contribution rate in the next period. Likewise, a contribution rate below b decreases the rate of return below m, which leads to further cuts in the contribution rate. This implies that the contribution rate will diverge from the steady-state if b t 6 ¼ b. In particular, the contribution rate will not fall to its new steady-state value but increase if the rate of population growth falls. Financial stability and constant direct and indirect taxes on labor income are therefore incompatible.
This result is summarized in Proposition 4. Constant direct and indirect taxes are not compatible with financial stability if the minimum pension is not used to guarantee financial stability. The contribution rate will not converge to a new steady state if the rate of population growth changes.
As a consequence, direct and indirect taxes on labor income need to change as well if the rate of population growth falls and the pension system is to be financially stable. For example, a constant contribution rate requires that indirect taxes on labor income must increase in at least one period if the rate of population growth declines. If total taxes on labor income are to be constant, direct taxes on labor income would therefore have to fall.
FURTHER ASPECTS
In this section, I address three further aspects. First, I consider to what extent non-linear taxes, which do not depend on age, are able to imitate agedependent taxes. Second, I discuss whether capital income taxation can be useful. Finally, I comment on the implications of an endogenous retirement age.
Non-linear taxes
Because income and age are highly correlated, non-linear taxation generally implies age-dependent marginal taxes. In particular, in real-world tax systems with progressive tariffs, tax rates depend on income. Such systems may be able to mimic optimal age-dependent linear taxes to some extent. Based on a model with a representative agent, Gervais (2004) shows that for this reason taxing labor income at progressive rates can be superior to an optimal flat rate M. Kifmann income tax. He also finds that the taxation of labor income through the lifecycle implied by the US tax code has a similar shape as the optimal Ramsey tax profile in his model.
With respect to the results of this paper, in particular Proposition 3, nonlinear taxes can therefore reduce the usefulness of the pension formula to implement age-dependent taxes. However, non-linear taxes can probably imitate optimal age-dependent taxes only partially as income and age are not completely correlated. In any case, age-dependent tax rates implied by nonlinear taxes should be taken into account if the pension formula is used to implement optimal age-dependent taxes.
Taxation of capital income
In principle, capital income taxes may be useful in the context of agedependent taxation as Erosa and Gervais (2002) demonstrate in a model with a representative agent. They consider both age-dependent taxes on labor and capital income and show that capital income taxes (and subsidies) can imitate a tax on leisure, a result akin to Corlett and Hague (1953) . In particular, if leisure increases with age, the tax rates on capital income should be positive for older individuals. Similar results can be expected if the model in this paper is extended to capital income taxation.
Endogenous retirement
This paper assumes that all individuals retire after period 2. In practice, there is some flexibility in the retirement age. In this context, the pension formula plays an important role as the level of benefits usually depends on the retirement age. In particular, most pensions systems are not actuarially fair at the margin and cut the level of benefits upon early retirement less than required by actuarial fairness. This tends to distort the retirement age downwards as working longer is implicitly taxed.
In a recent paper, Cremer et al. (2004) have provided a rationale for such a policy. In their model, individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their productivity and their capacity to work long. They choose both their weekly labor supply and their retirement age. 11 The regulator maximizes a utilitarian welfare function and can neither observe individual productivity nor the capacity to work long. Their main finding is that inducing early retirement can be part of the optimal tax-transfer policy.
In this paper, there is only one source of heterogeneity, the productivity of individuals. The preferences of individuals would have to be specified in more detail to introduce differences in the capacity to work long and the pension formula would need to take into account early retirement. Nevertheless, an argument for inducing early retirement can also be made if low labor supply in period 2 is interpreted as early retirement. In particular, if the capacity to work when old and productivity are positively correlated, this will tend to increase the covariance of the net social marginal valuation of income and labor income in period 2 in absolute terms. Following equation (35), this provides an argument for higher taxation in period 2 and hence for a downward distortion of labor supply in higher age.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has taken a comprehensive view of lifetime taxation, including both explicit taxation through the general tax system and implicit taxation via the retirement benefit formula. The following results were established:
(1) The analysis of Erosa and Gervais (2002) , Fenge et al. (2006) and Wrede (1999) was extended by allowing individuals to differ in productivity. This led to a generalized Ramsey rule. Optimal age-dependent taxes depend on the compensated elasticities of labor supply weighted with labor income and on the covariances of the net social marginal valuation of income and labor income in each period.
(2) The optimal retirement benefit formula was characterized in the presence of a general tax system. It was shown that the optimal retirement benefit formula cannot be defined independently of the general tax rates. However, a particular advantage of implicit taxation through the pension system is that age-dependent taxation can be implemented if direct taxes on labor income cannot depend on age.
(3) The paper demonstrated that financial stability and constant direct and indirect taxes on labor income are not compatible. Direct and indirect taxes on labor income therefore need to change if the rate of population growth changes and the pension system is to be financially stable.
The results of this paper may be useful for future empirical research. In particular, it would be interesting to examine the implications of the generalized Ramsey rule for optimal age-dependent taxation. Also the combined effect of income taxation and implicit taxation through the retirement benefit formula could be examined in an empirical study. Finally, it may be instructive to study how people perceive implicit taxation through the retirement benefit formula. In this paper, it was assumed that individuals can correctly infer the implicit age-dependent tax rates. However, the actuarial concepts, which are necessary to calculate these tax rates, may not be familiar to all citizens. 
APPENDIX A
In the following, I derive the necessary condition (55) for the contribution rate to converge to a steady state. With the rate of population growth m, average income Z t and the minimum pension a being constant, we obtain from equation (14) 
Substitution of the pension return factors (53) and (54) yields b tþ2 ¼ a þ ðb t À t b * 1 Þð1 þ rÞ 2 Z 1 þ ðb tþ1 À t b * 2 Þð1 þ rÞ Z 2 Z 1 ð1 þ mÞ 2 þ Z 2 ð1 þ mÞ ðA:2Þ
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3) is a linear autonomous second-order difference equation (see Hoy et al., 2001, Ch. 20) . Since a 2 1 À 4a 2 > 0; b t will converge to its steady value if and only if the following two conditions are met (see Hoy et al., 2001, Theorem 20.5 
